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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
C. R. England & Sons, Inc. ("England") , a Utah 
corporation, was named as a defendant in the Appellants1 
Complaint for Damages. England filed a third-party com-
plaint against A. N. R. Freight System, Inc. ("A.N.R."). 
England and A.N.R. settled the third-party claim, and 
the Appellants settled their claims against England before 
the scheduled date of trial. Appellants have not appealed 
any judgment in favor of England to this Court. In all 
proceedings before the District Court, England was 
represented by John M. Chipman and Linda L. W. Roth of 
Hanson, Nelson, Chipman & Quigley, and Frederick N. Green 
and Julie V. Lund of Green & Berry, and A.N.R. was repre-
sented by Stuart Poelman of Snow, Christensen & Martineau. 
All other parties are named in the caption of this 
appeal. 
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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to section 78-2-2(3)(j) , Utah Code Annotated, 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND THE LEGAL STANDARD 
FOP APPFT.TATF PT?VIEW OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. Does the record in this case contain sufficient 
evidence to allow a trier of fact to decide that the 
driver of the Cal Gas truck was negligent in the operation 
of his vehicle? 
2. Does res ipsa loquitur apply under the facts 
of this case? 
3. Does the record in this case contain sufficient 
evidence to allow a finder of fact to decide that the 
overturned Cal Gas truck was a proximate cause of the 
Appellants1 injuries? 
In Utah, M[a]ppellate courts scrutinize summary 
judgments under the same standard applied by the trial 
courts, according no particular deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions concerning whether the material 
facts are in dispute and, if they are not, what legal 
result obtains." Wvcalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 
780 P.2d 821, 824 (Utah App. 1989); accord Atlas Corpora-
tion v. Clovis National Bank. 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 
1987). Moreover, this court may affirm a summary judgment 
on any proper grounds, even if different from those relied 
on by the district court. Branch v. Western Petroleum, 
- 1 -
Inc. . 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982); Jesperson v. 
Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
The Plaintiffs, Joseph Kitchen ("Kitchen") 
and Richard Phillips ("Phillips"), initiated this civil 
action against C R. England & Sons, Inc. ("CR England"), 
and Cal Gas Company, Inc. ("Cal Gas") on April 13, 1987. 
In their Complaint for Damages, the Plaintiffs alleged 
that on February 6, 1986, Cal Gas negligently operated 
a semi tractor-tanker (the "Cal Gas Truck") by allowing 
it to overturn and block the eastbound lanes of Interstate 
80 near Wendover, Utah. As a result of that alleged 
negligence, the Plaintiffs assert, the semi tractor-trail-
er they were driving (the "ANR Truck") was forced to 
overturn, causing them personal injury. Similarly, the 
Plaintiffs alleged that CR England negligently operated 
a semi tractor-trailer (the "CR England Truck") by allow-
ing it to collide with the ANR Truck as the ANR Truck 
slowed. 
As a result of their injuries, the Plaintiffs sought 
general damages from Cal Gas and CR England in the total 
amount of $1 million, special damages in excess of $1 
million, interest on any award of special damages, costs 
- 2 -
and such other relief as the District Court might deem 
fair. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint for Damages 
on April 13# 1987. On September 12, 1988, Cal Gas moved 
for summary judgment on the grounds that, in view of 
the material facts in the record; the Plaintiffs could 
not show that the conduct of Cal Gas was the proximate 
cause of their injuries. By Order entered February 9, 
1989; the District Court denied the Cal Gas motion. 
Pre-trial discovery continued through November 1, 
1989. On that date Cal Gas again moved for summary judg-
ment. In its second motion; Cal Gas argued that summary 
judgment in its favor was proper because the Plaintiffs 
could not show that Cal Gas had breached a standard of 
care owed to them. In an Order in Limine and Summary 
Judgment entered on January 31; 1990; the District Court 
found that "on the undisputed facts viewed most favorably 
to the plaintiffs, no facts establish the Cal Gas driver 
was negligent; therefore any such finding by a jury could 
only be based on speculation." Accordingly, the District 
Court granted the Cal Gas Motion for Summary Judgment 
and dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims against Cal Gas 
with prejudice and on the merits. Final judgment as to 
- 3 -
Cal Gas was entered on January 31, 1990.1 This appeal 
follows from that final judgment, 
C. Statement of Facts. 
To present the facts in this case in the light 
most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment 
was granted, Cal Gas has derived the following statement 
of facts from the pleadings, deposition testimony and 
appeal brief of the Plaintiffs.2 
1. In February 1986, Kitchen and Phillips were 
employees of what is now A.N.R. Freight Systems, Inc., 
and were, respectively, the driver and alternate driver 
of the ANR Truck. See Record at 3, f7; Deposition of 
Joseph Richard Kitchen ("Kitchen Deposition11), pp. 6, 12. 
2. On February 5, 1986, Kitchen and Phillips drove 
the ANR Truck out of Los Angeles heading for the ANR 
terminal in Salt Lake City. Kitchen Deposition, pp. 
35-36. Early in the morning of February 6th, they stopped 
at the Port of Entry immediately east of Wendover, Utah 
1
 A copy of the Final Judgment is included in 
the Addendum, together with the minute entry from the 
hearing at which Cal Gas1 motion was granted and the 
Order in Limine and Summary Judgment. 
2
 Not all of these facts were undisputed below. 
For example, CR England disputed the claim that its truck 
struck the ANR Truck from behind, causing it to overturn. 
CR England was able to establish through its accident 
reconstruction expert that the ANR Truck was on its side 
when the CR England Truck first came in contact with 
it. But none of these factual disputes is material to 
Cal Gas1 Motion for Summary Judgment or the issues raised 
on appeal. 
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(the "Port of Entry") , to have the ANR Truck weighed. 
See Kitchen Deposition, pp. 42-43. 
3. The Plaintiffs were told by a Utah Highway 
Patrolman at the Port of Entry that there would be black 
ice on Interstate 80 beginning 12 to 14 miles east of 
the Port of Entry and continuing all the way into Salt 
Lake City. Kitchen Deposition, p. 44. 
4. Five minutes after the Plaintiffs left the 
Port of Entry, at a point less than one mile east of 
the Port of Entry, they were passed by the Cal Gas Truck. 
Kitchen Deposition, pp. 48-49.3 
5. At the point on Interstate 80 where the Cal 
Gas Truck passed the ANR Truck (approximately one mile 
east of the Port of Entry) , the surface of Interstate 
80 was wet, but not icy. Kitchen Deposition, pp. 48, 
46. 
6. Kitchen first encountered black ice 14 or 15 
miles east of the point at which the Cal Gas Truck passed 
the ANR Truck. Kitchen Deposition, pp. 48-49, 46. 
7. About 19 miles east of the Port of Entry, while 
driving 20 to 25 miles per hour, the ANR Truck was passed 
by a Toyota pickup truck. Kitchen Deposition, pp. 49-
51. The Toyota truck had been driving in the left-hand 
3
 The trial court granted Cal Gas1 Motion in Limine 
to exclude this evidence on the grounds that it was not 
relevant and was more prejudicial than probative. See 
Record at 253-54 and 311-12. 
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lane, and the ANR Truck was in the right-hand lane. 
The Toyota truck turned on its high beams, and Kitchen 
saw "a shadow" in the road ahead, "like a glare...from 
the lights hitting on the object." Kitchen Deposition, 
p. 50. The object was at least one-quarter mile away. 
Kitchen Deposition, p. 53. 
8. Between the time the Cal Gas Truck passed the 
ANR Truck coming out of the Port of Entry and the time 
the Toyota truck passed the ANR Truck, approximately 45 
minutes had elapsed. See Kitchen Deposition, pp. 48-
50, 114. 
9. As the Toyota truck passed the ANR Truck, 
Kitchen took his foot off the throttle to let the Toyota 
truck into his lane ahead of him. Kitchen Deposition, 
p. 52. 
10. Almost immediately thereafter, the CR England 
Truck struck the ANR Truck from behind, causing Kitchen 
to lose control of the truck and causing the truck to 
overturn on its side, injuring the Plaintiffs. Kitchen 
Deposition, pp. 52, 79-80, 96-97; Record at 4, fll. 
11. After the Plaintiffs were pulled out of their 
truck, they saw the Cal Gas Truck overturned ahead of 
them, blocking the left-hand lane and part of the right-
hand lane. Kitchen Deposition, pp. 49, 51; Deposition 
of Richard Allen Phillips ("Phillips Deposition"), pp. 
12, 14. 
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12. Immediately before the ANR Truck was struck 
from the rear by the CR England Truck, Kitchen was in 
control of the ANR Truck. Kitchen Deposition, p. 79. 
13. If the CR England Truck had not struck the 
ANR Truck, Kitchen could have stopped the ANR Truck short 
of the Cal Gas Truck without applying his brakes. Kitchen 
Deposition, pp. 52, 128. 
14. To stop the ANR Truck without striking the 
Cal Gas Truck, Kitchen needed to do no more than take 
his foot off the throttle. Kitchen Deposition, p. 128. 
15. The ANR Truck never struck the Cal Gas Truck. 
Kitchen Deposition, p. 93. In fact, after the ANR Truck 
overturned, it came to rest 200 feet away from the Cal 
Gas Truck. Appellants1 Brief, p. 2. 
16. The cause of the turnover of the ANR Truck 
was the rear-end collision with the CR England truck 
that occurred when Kitchen slowed the ANR Truck by remov-
ing his foot from the throttle, to let the Toyota into 
the right-hand travel lane. Appellants' Brief, p. 3. 
17. The cause of the Plaintiffs' injuries was the 
overturning of their truck following the collision with 
the CR England Truck. Record at 4, Jll. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In their Complaint For Damages, the Plaintiffs claim 
that the negligence of Cal Gas caused their injuries. 
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In the arguments that follow, Cal Gas will show that, 
based on the undisputed material facts, the Plaintiffs 
cannot establish two of the four elements of a negli-
gence claim. 
Cal Gas will first show that the record in this 
case will not allow the Plaintiffs to demonstrate that 
Cal Gas breached a duty of care owed to them. This is 
so, even if the Plaintiffs attempt to establish a breach 
of duty through circumstantial evidence by invoking the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
Second, Cal Gas will show that the record in this 
case will not allow the Plaintiffs to prove that the 
conduct of Cal Gas was the proximate cause of their 
injuries. 
The Plaintiffs1 factual allegations are nothing 
more than assumptions and gross speculation, which is 
insufficient to get to a jury. Because the record in this 
case cannot support a showing that Cal Gas breached a 
duty owed to the Plaintiffs or a showing that the conduct 
of Cal Gas was the proximate cause of the Plaintiffs1 
injuries, Cal Gas is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law. This Court should therefore affirm the summary 
judgment entered by the District Court. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE STANDARD FOR GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment 
is sought, may, at any time, move 
with or without supporting affidavits 
for a summary judgment in his favor 
as to all or any part thereof. 
When determining whether a grant of summary judgment in 
favor of a defendant is proper, the question the court 
must answer is whether "the pleadings, depositions, an-
swers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and [whether] the [defend-
ant] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). In examining a motion for summary 
judgment, the court views the facts in the case in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. 
Barlow Society v. Commercial Security Bank. 723 P.2d 
398, 399 (Utah 1986). However, "the mere existence of 
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will 
not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for 
summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no 
- 9 -
genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).4 
In determining what facts are material, the Court 
must look to the substantive law. Id. at 248. The United 
States Supreme Court has stated the standard for materi-
ality as follows: 
Only disputes over facts that might 
affect the outcome of the suit under 
the governing law will properly 
preclude the entry of summary judg-
ment. Factual disputes that are 
irrelevant or unnecessary will not 
be counted. 
Id. 
Rule 56 further provides that: 
When a motion for summary judgment 
is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may 
not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavits or as other-
wise provided in this rule, must 
set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. If he does not so respond, 
summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). Accordingly, the party opposing 
the motion for summary judgment "must do more than simply 
4
 Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is identi-
cal in all relevant respects to Rule S6, Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Where Utah procedural rules are 
substantially similar to their federal counterparts, 
this Court has looked to the federal courts1 interpret-
ation of the federal rules in construing the corresponding 
state procedural rules. See, e.g.. Prowswood. Inc. v. 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company. 676 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah 
1984) . 
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show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the 
material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Company 
v. Zenith Radio Corporation. 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 
Indeed, the trial court must grant summary judgment where 
there is insufficient evidence to warrant giving the 
case to a jury at trial and the movant is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. Anderson. 477 U.S. at 250. 
A party moving for summary judgment has the ultimate 
burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue 
of material fact. However, where, as here, the non-moving 
party will bear the burden of persuasion on the issues 
at trial, the moving party can satisfy its initial burden 
of production in either of two ways. First, the moving 
party can offer affirmative evidence that negates an 
essential element of the non-moving party's cause of 
action. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 323 
(1986) ("A complete failure of proof concerning an essent-
ial element of the non-moving partyfs case necessarily 
renders all other facts immaterial"). Second, the moving 
party may affirmatively show that even if the record 
contains some evidence that supports the non-moving par-
ty's claim, there is nonetheless insufficient evidence 
to allow the non-moving party to meet the standard of 
proof applicable to each element of his cause of action 
at trial on the merits. Robinson v. IHC. Inc.. 740 P.2d 
262, 264 (Utah App. 1987); see Celotex. 477 U.S. at 325. 
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The United States Supreme Court has declared that: 
Rule 56 must be construed with due 
regard not only for the rights of 
persons asserting claims and 
defenses..., but also for the rights 
of persons opposing such claims and 
defenses to demonstrate in the manner 
provided by the Rule, prior to trial, 
that the claims and defenses have 
no factual basis. 
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327. Accordingly, the District 
Courtfs grant of summary judgment in favor of Cal Gas 
must be viewed "not as a disfavored procedural shortcut," 
id., but as the proper application of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which were promulgated "to secure the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action." Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a); see Celotex. 477 U.S. 
at 327. 
This Court has recognized that although a claim in 
negligence ordinarily raises questions that ought to be 
resolved by the trier of fact, where the facts material 
to an essential element of a cause of action in negligence 
are undisputed, and only one reasonable conclusion may 
be drawn from those facts, the entire issue of negligence 
may be disposed of in summary judgment proceedings. 
See, e.g. , Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 
1983); FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Insurance Co.. 
594 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah 1979). 
- 12 -
II. 
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE CONTAINS NO EVIDENCE 
THAT CAL GAS BREACHED ITS DUTY OF REASONABLE CARE 
In Utah, a plaintiff asserting a cause of action 
in negligence must prove the following four elements of 
the tort by a preponderance of the evidence: "(1) A 
duty of reasonable care owed by the defendant to the 
plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) the causation, 
both actually and proximately of injury; and (4) the 
suffering of damages by the plaintiff." Williams v. 
Melby. 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985); White v. Blackburn, 
787 P.2d 1315, 1319 (Utah App. 1990). 
To establish their cause of action in negligence, 
the Plaintiffs first must show that Cal Gas owed them a 
duty of care. Beech v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 
413, 415 (Utah 1986); Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 
726 (Utah 1985). The duty owed by one party to another 
is entirely a question of law to be determined by the 
court. Ferree v. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 
1989) . 
The Plaintiffs argue that it was the duty of the 
driver of the Cal Gas Truck to maintain control over 
his vehicle so as not to allow it to overturn and thereby 
block the traffic lanes of Interstate 80. Appellants1 
Brief, p. 16. In a correlative argument, the Plaintiffs 
assert that the Cal Gas Truck driver breached his duty 
- 13 -
to them when he "overturned his truck and left it laying 
in the road blocking the eastbound lanes[.]" !£• 
The Plaintiffs' argument overstates the Cal Gas 
Truck driverfs duty. One who drives a vehicle does not 
have a "duty" to operate the vehicle faultlessly such 
that he will be held strictly liable for any shortcoming 
in those operations, fault notwithstanding. The only 
duty he has is to exercise reasonable care under the 
circumstances. In other words, to establish their claim 
for negligence, the Plaintiffs had to show, by a prepond-
erance of the evidence, that the driver of the Cal Gas 
Truck either failed to do what a reasonable and prudent 
truck driver would have done under the circumstances, 
or that he did what such a truck driver under the circum-
stances would not have done. See Meese v. Briaham Young 
University, 639 P.2d 720, 723 (Utah 1981). Thus, when 
offering their evidence, the Plaintiffs had to do more 
than point to a Cal Gas Truck later found overturned 
and beg the question whether negligence caused its wreck. 
As this Court made clear in Horsley v. Robinson, 112 
Utah 227, 186 P.2d 592, 596 (Utah 1947), the mere occur-
rence of a vehicle accident, considered alone, does not 
support the inference that the vehicle1 s driver was negli-
gent. Indeed, in Utah, one operating a motor vehicle 
is presumed to be exercising due care, if for no reason 
other than to safeguard his own well-being. DeMille v. 
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Erickson, 23 Utah 2d 278, 462 P.2d 159, 161 (Utah 1969), 
cert, denied, 397 U.S. 1079 (1970). While this presump-
tion is rebuttable, it can be overcome only by inferences 
well rooted in the circumstances of the accident. Id. 
Perhaps in recognition of the rules in Horslev and 
DeMille. the Plaintiffs have tried to spin a web of facts 
and circumstances that they believe will allow a finder 
of fact to infer that the Cal Gas Truck's driver's negli-
gence must have caused the Cal Gas Truck to overturn. 
For example, the Plaintiffs claim in their deposition 
testimony that before they had driven one mile east from 
the Port of Entry, and while traveling at 20 to 25 miles 
per hour, they were passed by the Cal Gas Truck. Kitchen 
Deposition, pp. 48, 46; Phillips Deposition, pp. 10-11. 
The inference that the Plaintiffs would like this court 
to draw from this statement is, of course, that the Cal 
Gas driver was operating his vehicle in an unreasonable 
manner prior to his accident. The trial court recognized 
that the probative value of this testimony, if any, was 
clearly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. Moreover, 
as even a cursory review of the facts in this case 
reveals, any such inference regarding either the conduct 
of the Cal Gas driver when his truck overturned or the 
circumstances that attended his accident is unfounded. 
By Kitchen's own testimony, the surface of Interstate 
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80 near the Port of Entry—where the Cal Gas Truck passed 
the ANR Truck—was wet, but was not icy. The record 
contains no evidence that the speed of the Cal Gas truck, 
though greater than that of the ANR Truck, was unreason-
able in such conditions. 
In addition, Kitchen testified during his deposition 
that his rate of speed while traveling east on Interstate 
80 was 20 to 25 miles per hour and that the distance 
between the point at which the Cal Gas Truck passed him 
and the point at which the Cal Gas Truck overturned was 
eighteen miles. The unavoidable implication of these 
two undisputed facts is that neither Kitchen nor Phillips 
had any opportunity to observe the Cal Gas driver operate 
his vehicle for approximately forty-five minutes before 
they encountered the overturned Cal Gas Truck. Thus, 
Kitchen's reference to the episode of one truck safely 
passing another gives rise to no well grounded inference 
about the Cal Gas Truck driver's conduct before his truck 
overturned eighteen miles farther east, forty-five minutes 
later, and in quite different road conditions.5 
Not only are there no facts to show that the Cal 
Gas Truck overturned as a result of the Cal Gas driver's 
negligence, but there are also no facts establishing 
that the Cal Gas Truck was overturned before the ANR 
5
 During his deposition, Kitchen also testified 
that at the point at which the Cal Gas Truck was found 
overturned, Interstate 80 was subject to black ice. 
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Truck overturned. No one saw the Cal Gas Truck overturned 
before the accident, and there was no expert testimony 
to suggest facts from which one could infer the sequence 
of events. 
It is clear from the Plaintiffs1 ungrounded assump-
tions about the facts and circumstances of the Cal Gas 
Truck's accident that at trial they intend to invite 
the finder of fact to speculate on the reasonableness 
of the Cal Gas Truck driver's conduct immediately before 
his vehicle overturned and on the timing of the accident. 
This formula for establishing a breach of a duty of care 
has been expressly rejected by this Court. In DeMille 
v. Erickson. 462 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969), the Court held 
that in a trial on the merits of a negligence claim, 
the evidence on the defendant's breach of a duty of rea-
sonable care must be comprehensive enough to allow the 
finder of fact no reason or opportunity to speculate on 
the circumstances immediately preceding the allegedly 
negligent conduct. While justifiable inferences from 
circumstantial evidence are permissible, resort to sheer 
conjecture about the conduct of the Cal Gas Truck driver 
may not be offered as a substitute for a showing by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the truck driver's 
conduct was negligent. Lindsay v. Gibbons & Reed, 27 
Utah 2d 419, 497 P.2d 28, 31 (Utah 1972). So, while 
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there is always the possibility that the Cal Gas Truck 
overturned because its driver was negligent, 
for a decision imposing liability 
to respond in damages, this is not 
enough. What is required is evidence, 
which means some sort of proof; and 
it must be evidence from which reason-
able persons may conclude that, upon 
the whole, it is more likely that 
the event was caused by negligence 
than that it was not. As long as 
the conclusion is a matter of mere 
speculation or conjecture, or where 
the probabilities are at best evenly 
balanced between negligence and its 
absence, it becomes the duty of the 
court to direct a jury that the burden 
of proof has not been sustained. 
W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton 
on the Law of Torts. § 39, at 242 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 
1988) (footnotes omitted). 
Even when the facts of this case, and the permis-
sible inferences drawn from those facts, are considered 
in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, there is 
no evidence that Cal Gas breached its duty to the 
Plaintiffs. Cal Gas is therefore entitled to the summary 
judgment it seeks on the Plaintiffs' claim of negligence. 
III. 
THE DOCTRINE OF EIS IPSA LOQUITUR IS 
INAPPLICABLE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE 
To bridge the void between the Plaintiffs1 accident 
and the conduct of the Cal Gas driver, the Plaintiffs 
have resorted to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. To 
succeed along this evidentiary tack, however, the Plaint-
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iffs must show that the record in this case contains 
evidence sufficient to establish that (1) their injury 
"was of a kind which in the ordinary course of events, 
would not have happened had [Cal Gas] used due care," 
Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, 791 P.2d 
193, 196 (Utah 1990); (2) they did not bring their injury 
upon themselves by their own use or operation of the 
agency or instrumentality that caused their injury, 
Ballow v, Monroe. 699 P.2d 719, 721 (Utah 1985); and 
(3) the agency or instrumentality causing their injury 
was within the exclusive control and management of Cal 
Gas. Rovlance v. Rove, 737 P.2d 232, 235 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
A plaintiff's recourse to res ipsa loquitur will 
yield only limited substantive gain. As this Court has 
explained, 
[T]he purpose of res ipsa loquitur 
is "to permit one who suffers injury 
from something under the control of 
another, which ordinarily would not 
cause injury except for the other's 
negligence, to present his griev-
ance to a court or jury on the basis 
that an inference of negligence may 
reasonably be drawn from such facts 
it 
• • • • 
Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828, 833 (Utah 1980) 
(quoting Lund v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 Utah 2d 276, 
351 P.2d 952 (I960)). In other words, a plaintiff who 
successfully invokes res ipsa loquitur does no more than 
marshal sufficient circumstantial evidence to permit 
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the inference that the defendant owed the plaintiff a 
duty of care and breached that duty. Robinson v. Inter-
mountain Health Care. Inc.. 740 P.2d.262, 264 (Utah App. 
1987) . 
A. The Plaintiffs Cannot Show That Their Injuries Would 
Not Have Happened Had Cal Gas Used Due Care. 
Any attempt by the Plaintiffs to establish the first 
element of res ipsa loquitur—namely, that their injuries 
were of a kind that would not have happened had Cal Gas 
used due care—will place them, once again, squarely at 
odds with this Court's holdings in Horsley v. Robinson. 
186 P.2d 592 (Utah 1947), and DeMille v. Erickson. 462 
P.2d 159 (Utah 1969). As Cal Gas has pointed out in 
Section II above, in Utah the mere occurrence of a vehicle 
accident, considered alone, does not support the inference 
that the vehicle's driver was negligent. Moreover, the 
driver of a motor vehicle enjoys the presumption under 
Utah law that he is exercising due care. 
This case demonstrates the fallacy of the Plaintiffs' 
argument. If an overturned truck were the kind of acci-
dent that, in the ordinary course of events, would not 
have happened if the driver had used due care, then one 
would have to conclude that the Plaintiffs did not use 
due care, since their truck also overturned, in which 
case they could not meet the second element of res ipsa 
loquitur. Of course, the Plaintiffs do not claim that 
their own negligence contributed to their accident. 
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But without any evidence except an overturned truck, 
one can no more conclude that the Cal Gas driver was 
negligent that one could conclude that the Plaintiffs 
were negligent. Obviously, trucks can overturn even if 
the driver has used due care, and the Plaintiffs' own 
Complaint must concede as much. 
The Plaintiffs can point to no evidence in the record 
that allows them to draw a well-founded inference that 
the Cal Gas Truck overturned either before the ANR Truck 
or due to negligence. At best, the Plaintiffs can hope 
to make the question of negligence a matter of speculation 
or show the possibility of a negligent cause of the 
accident. In either event, the Plaintiffs would fail 
to carry their burden of demonstrating that it is more 
likely than not that Cal Gas' negligence is responsible 
for the overturned Cal Gas Truck. Because the Plaintiffs 
cannot satisfy this first requirement of the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur, their effort to establish that 
Cal Gas breached its duty to them by circumstantial evi-
dence must fail. 
B. The Plaintiffs Cannot Show That the Instrumentality 
Causing Their Injury Was Within the Exclusive Control 
and Management of Cal Gas. 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
permits [a plaintiff], in lieu of 
linking his injury to a specific 
act on defendant's part, to caus-
ally connect it with an agency or 
instrumentality, under the exclusive 
control of the defendant, functioning 
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in a manner which, under the circum-
stances , would produce no injury 
absent negligence. However, where 
the agency or instrumentality is 
not established to be the cause of 
plaintiff's injury, or where it is 
not shown to be under the exclusive 
control of the defendant, the causal 
connection is not established, and 
the inference of negligent conduct 
giving rise thereto is nullified. 
Anderton. 607 P.2d at 834 (emphasis added). Thus, when 
a plaintiff relies on res ipsa loquitur to establish a 
prima facie case of negligence, causation becomes the 
crucial issue. Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical 
Center, 791 P.2d 193, 196 (Utah 1990). 
The Plaintiffs may prove causation by either tracing 
their injuries "to a specific instrumentality or cause 
for which the defendant was responsible" or showing "that 
the defendant was responsible for all reasonably probable 
causes to which the accident could be attributed." 
Dalley. 791 P.2d at 197 (citing W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. 
Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts, 
S 39 at 248 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988)). However, a 
showing that the defendant was responsible "for all 
reasonably probable causes" is appropriate to those situa-
tions in which the plaintiff cannot know the precise 
cause of his injury. See, e.g.. Dalley. 791 P.2d at 197 
(a hospital patient injured while under anesthesia cannot 
be expected to know the incident or instrumentality res-
ponsible for her injury). 
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Because the Plaintiffs observed and consciously 
participated in the events that immediately preceded 
their injuries, they are capable of knowing the "specific 
instrumentality" that caused their accident. Conse-
quently , they must prove causation in the context of 
res ipsa loquitur by showing that Cal Gas was responsible 
for that instrumentality. This is an impossible task, 
however, because the undisputed facts material to the 
causation of the Plaintiffs1 injury establish that the 
following sequence of events occurred in the early hours 
of February 6, 1986: (1) Kitchen was in control of the 
ANR Truck when he first saw the reflection of something 
in the road, (2) Kitchen could have stopped the ANR Truck 
safely without using his brakes, (3) Kitchen decelerated 
when a Toyota truck turned into his lane of travel, (4) 
the CR England Truck collided with the ANR Truck from 
behind, (5) due to the collision, Kitchen lost control 
of the ANR Truck, and (6) the ANR Truck overturned, strik-
ing the side of its tractor cab against the pavement of 
Interstate 80. See supra. Statement of Facts 55 7-10, 
12-14 and 16-17. Thus it is undisputed that the CR 
England Truck is the instrumentality that injured the 
Plaintiffs and further undisputed that the Cal Gas driver 
not only had no control over the CR England Truck at 
any time during this unfortunate chain of events, but 
also was never closer than 200 feet to the ANR Truck 
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during the entire episode. See, supra, Statement of Facts 
115. 
Because the Plaintiffs cannot show that the agency 
or instrumentality in the control of Cal Gas (the Cal 
Gas Truck) is the cause of their injury or that the 
instrumentality that did cause their injury (the CR 
England Truck) is under the exclusive control of Cal 
Gas, "the causal connection is not established and the 
inference of negligent conduct [afforded by res ipsa 
loquitur] is nullified." Anderton, 607 P.2d at 834. 
IV. 
THE PLAINTIFFS CANNOT SHOW THAT THE 
CONDUCT OF CAL GAS, EVEN IF NEGLIGENT, 
IS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THEIR INJURY 
In Anderton v. Montgomery. 607 P.2d 828, 834 (Utah 
1980), this court explained that the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur 
has no bearing on the issue of 
causation, which must be separately 
and independently established. As 
in any negligence action, a legally-
recognizable causal link must be 
established between defendant's act 
or omission and plaintiff's injury. 
Absent such a causal relationship, 
defendant's conduct, negligent or 
otherwise, gives rise to no liability. 
(Emphasis added and footnotes omitted.) So even if the 
Plaintiffs successfully employ the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur to show that Cal Gas breached a duty of care 
owed to them, they still must show that Cal Gas's alleged 
breach of duty was a "proximate cause" of their injury. 
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Butterfield v. Okubo. 790 P.2d 94, 98 (UtahApp.) (without 
proof of proximate cause, a plaintiff's claim of negli-
gence must fail), cert, granted, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 
1990). 
A proximate cause of an injury is "one which, in 
natural and continuous sequence (unbroken by an effi-
cient intervening cause) , produces the injury and without 
which the result would not have occurred. It is the 
efficient cause—the one that necessarily sets in opera-
tion the factors that accomplish the injury." Mitchell 
v. Pearson Enterprises. 697 P.2d 240, 245-46 (Utah 1985) 
(quoting State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479, 482 n.3 (Utah 
1985)). 
To establish this essential element of the tort of 
negligence, the Plaintiffs must introduce "substantial 
evidence" that the conduct of Cal Gas was responsible 
for their injuries. Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 246. Substan-
tial evidence is that "which furnishes a substantial 
basis of fact from which the issues tendered can reason-
ably be resolved." Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments, 
Ltd. . 754 P.2d 89, 92 n.2 (UtahApp. 1988) (quoting Wasson 
v. Brewer's Food Mart. Inc., 7 Kan. App. 2d 259, 640 
P.2d 352, 356-57 (1982)). Moreover, it is evidence that 
affords a trier of fact no opportunity to speculate about 
the link between the conduct of Cal Gas and the injury 
of the Plaintiffs. As this Court has noted, "when the 
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proximate cause of an injury is left to speculation, 
the claim fails as a matter of law." Mitchell, 697 P.2d 
at 246. 
Because the burden of proof at trial on the question 
of proximate cause lies with the Plaintiffs, the party 
against whom summary judgment is sought, Cal Gas may 
secure the summary judgment it seeks if it shows that 
the record in this case lacks "substantial evidence" 
that absent Cal Gas1 allegedly negligent conduct, the 
Plaintiffs1 injury would not have occurred. Robinson 
v. IHC. Inc.. 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah App. 1987); see 
Celotex. 477 U.S. at 325. 
The facts in the record material to the causation 
of the Plaintiffs1 injuries by the overturned Cal Gas 
Truck are these: 
1. Kitchen first saw an object in the highway from 
a distance of no less than one-quarter mile. Kitchen 
Deposition, p. 53. 
2. When he saw the object, Kitchen was driving 
the ANR Truck at 20 to 25 miles per hour. Kitchen Depo-
sition, p. 50. 
3. Kitchen took his foot off the throttle because 
a Toyota pickup signaled and moved from the passing lane 
to the travel lane. When he did so, the ANR Truck was 
immediately struck from the rear by the CR England Truck. 
Kitchen Deposition, pp. 49-52. 
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4. Immediately before the ANR Truck was struck 
from the rear by the CR England Truck, Kitchen was in 
control of the ANR Truck. Kitchen Deposition, p. 79. 
5. If the CR England Truck had not struck the ANR 
Truck, Kitchen could have brought the ANR Truck to a 
halt short of the Cal Gas Truck without applying his 
brakes. Kitchen Deposition, pp. 128 and 52. All he 
needed to do was take his foot off the throttle, and 
the ANR Truck would have come to a stop without striking 
the Cal Gas Truck. Kitchen Deposition, p. 128. 
6. The ANR Truck never struck anything. Kitchen 
Deposition, p. 93. In fact, when the ANR Truck overturned 
after the collision with the CR England Truck, it was 
still 200 feet away from where the Cal Gas Truck was 
found. Appellants1 Brief, p. 2. 
7. The cause of the turnover of the ANR Truck 
was the lane change by the Toyota and the rear-end colli-
sion with the CR England Truck that occurred when Kitchen 
slowed the ANR Truck by removing his foot from the 
throttle. Appellants1 Brief, p. 3. 
8. The cause of the Plaintiffs1 injuries was the 
overturning of the ANR Truck following the collision 
with the CR England Truck. Record at 4, 511. 
All of these material facts are undisputed. As 
the citation associated with each makes clear, they are 
all set out in documents submitted by the Plaintiffs or 
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derived from testimony offered by the Plaintiffs. More-
over, they offer an accurate, comprehensive summary of 
the facts in this case material to the causal relation-
ship between the overturned Cal Gas Truck and the injuries 
sustained by the Plaintiffs. 
The Plaintiffs have alleged that the overturned 
Cal Gas Truck was the proximate cause of their injuries, 
i.e., the link between negligence and their injuries 
and the instrument without which their injuries would 
not have occurred. Yet the material facts disclose that 
by their own words and through their own actions, even 
the Plaintiffs recognized that the object in the roadway 
did not bring about their injuries. Kitchen first saw 
the object from a quarter of a mile away, a distance 
that allowed him to stop the ANR Truck without using 
his brakes and without losing control of his vehicle. 
In fact, the undisputed evidence is that Kitchen's 
response to the sighting of the object had every prospect 
of bringing the ANR Truck to a safe stop 200 feet short 
of a collision. Kitchen removed his foot from the accel-
erator only because the Toyota made a lane change, which 
resulted in the impact he felt from the rear. 
In short, the undisputed facts material to the issue 
of the causation of the Plaintiffs1 injuries do not offer 
any, let alone substantial, evidence that the conduct 
of Cal Gas was the proximate cause of the Plaintiffs1 
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injuries. The only reasonable conclusion that the mater-
ial facts will permit is that the Cal Gas Truck was not 
implicated in the events that caused the Plaintiffs1 
injuries. Accordingly, this Court must conclude as a 
matter of law that Cal Gas was not the proximate cause 
of the Plaintiffs1 injuries and must therefore affirm 
the summary judgment entered in favor of Cal Gas by the 
District Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The record in this case demonstrates an absence of 
genuine issues of material fact as to two essential 
elements of the Plaintiffs' cause of action: a breach 
of the duty Cal Gas owed to the Plaintiffs and proximate 
causation of the Plaintiffs1 injuries by the conduct of 
Cal Gas. After all the smoke is cleared away, the Plaint-
iffs are simply asking the Court to hold that negligence 
can be established merely by showing that an accident 
occurred. Unless this Court chooses to overturn years 
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of precedent, it must affirm the District Court's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of Cal Gas. 
DATED this /r day of February, 1991. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Hanson, Jr. 
Fred R. Silvester 
Charles P. Sampson 
Attorneys for Appellee, 
Cal Gas Company, Inc, 
(Original Signature) 
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BASED UPON ARGUMENT OF RESPECTIVE COUNSEL, THE COURT ORDERS 
CAL GAS INC. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED. THE MOTION 
IN LIMINE IS GRANTED. THE COURT FINDS THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE 
OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF CAL GAS. ALL EXHIBITS & DEPOSITION 
S ARE PUBLISHED. TRIAL TO BE RESET. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH KITCHEN and | 
RICHARD PHILLIPS, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
v. ! 
C. R. ENGLAND & SONS, INC., a j 
Utah corporation, and CAL GAS ] 
COMPANY, INC., a California ] 
corporation, ] 
Defendants. ] 
i ORDER IN LIMINE 
I AND 
i SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
l Civil No. C87-02515 
I Judge Frank G. Noel 
The Court having reviewed defendant Cal Gas' motion in 
limine to exclude evidence of speed and Cal Gas1 motion for 
summary judgment; having considered the memoranda of defendant 
Cal Gas and plaintiffs Kitchen and Phillips; having heard 
arguments of counsel as to Cal Gas* motion for summary 
judgment; and having granted plaintiffs' motion to publish all 
discovery and having considered same; 
The Court finds on the undisputed material facts 
viewed most favorably to the plaintiffs, no facts establish the 
Cal Gas driver was negligent, therefore any such finding by a 
jury could only be based on speculation. 
\j -^ \j<K*0 -JL JL. 
& * * * & " ' • • 
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Defendant Cal Gas* Motion in Limine is granted; 
2. Defendant Cal Gas* Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted and plaintiffs' claims against Cal Gas are dismissed 
with prejudice and on the merits. 
The Court further finds pursuant to the provisions of 
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that there is no 
just reason for delay and hereby expressly directs entry of 
judgment for defendant Cal Gas on plaintiffs' claims. 
lis day of January, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
DATED thi! 
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District Court Judge 
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I FINAL JUDGMENT 
i Civil No. C87-02515 
I Judge Frank G. Noel 
The Court having previously entered summary judgment in 
favor of defendant Cal Gas, and having found pursuant to Rule 54(b) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, no just reason to delay entry of 
judgment for defendant Cal Gas, therefore 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
1. Plaintiffs' claims against defendant Cal Gas be 
dismissed with prejudice on the merits; 
2. The Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, enter this final judgment 
forthwith. 
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